Financial regulatory transparency: new data and implications for EU policy. Bruegel Policy Brief 2015/20, December 2015 by Hallerberg, Mark. et al.
ISSUE 2015/20 
DECEMBER 2015 FINANCIAL REGULATORY
TRANSPARENCY: NEW
DATA AND IMPLICATIONS
FOR EU POLICY
MARK COPELOVITCH, CHRISTOPHER GANDRUD AND MARK
HALLERBERG
Highlights
• International financial institutions have promoted financial regulatory transparency,
or the publication by supervisors of financial industry data. Financial regulatory
transparency enhances market stability and increases democratic legitimacy. 
• We introduce a new index of financial regulatory data transparency: the FRT Index.
It measures how countries report to international financial institutions basic macro-
prudential data about their financial systems. The Index covers 68 high-income and
emerging-market economies over 22 years (1990-2011).
• We find a number of striking trends over this period. European Union members are
generally more opaque than other high-income countries. This finding is especially
relevant given efforts to create an EU capital markets union.
• Globally, financial regulatory data transparency has increased. However, there is
considerable variation. Some countries have become significantly more transparent,
while others have become much more opaque. Reporting tends to decline during
financial crises.
• We propose that the EU institutions take on a greater role in coordinating and
possibly enforcing reporting of bank and non-bank institution data. Similar to the
United States, a reporting requirement should be part of any EU general deposit
insurance scheme.
Mark Copelovitch (copelovitch@wisc.edu) is an Associate Professor at the Robert M. La
Follette School of Public Affairs, University of Wisconsin, Madison. Christopher Gandrud
(gandrud@hertie-school.org) is a researcher at the Hertie School of Governance. Mark
Hallerberg (hallerberg@hertie-school.org) is a Bruegel non-resident fellow and Director
of the Hertie School of Governance’s Fiscal Governance Centre.
Telephone
+32 2 227 4210 
info@bruegel.org
www.bruegel.org 
BRUEGEL
POLICY
CONTRIBUTION
FINANCIAL REGULATORY TRANSPARENCY: NEW
DATA AND IMPLICATIONS FOR EU POLICY
MARK COPELOVITCH, CHRISTOPHER GANDRUD AND MARK HALLERBERG
02
BRUEGEL
POLICY
CONTRIBUTION
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nal/np/mae/mft/Code/index
.htm; accessed October
2015.
2. See
https://www.imf.org/exter-
nal/np/exr/facts/data.htm;
accessed October 2015.
3. See
http://www.imf.org/exter-
nal/np/fsap/fssa.aspx;
accessed October 2015.
Financial regulatory transparency refers to the
availability of financial industry data made public
by supervisors. It has been lauded as a measure
to enhance market stability (Arnone et al, 2007)
and democratic legitimacy (Gandrud and Haller-
berg, 2015). As with fiscal transparency, which
concerns the availability of public sector financial
data, and monetary policy transparency, which
concerns the data monetary policymakers use to
set interest rates, international financial institu-
tions have promoted regulatory transparency.
Following the East Asian crisis of the late 1990s,
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) included
transparency in its 1999 Code of Good Practices
on Transparency in Monetary and Financial
Policies1 and introduced data dissemination stan-
dards for making financial data available
beginning in 19962. Similar to its measures to pro-
mote fiscal transparency, the IMF has established
a Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP),
under which it conducts voluntary reviews of the
stability of financial sectors and the development
of those sectors. ‘Transparency’ is one key
consideration within this programme. While it is up
to the country in question to approve publication
of the IMF’s FSAP review, most are publicly
available online, and they usually include a review
of the extent to which a given country observes
the Fund’s standards and codes3.
The Basel Committee for Banking Supervision
added regulatory transparency to its Core
Principles for Effective Banking Supervision in
2006. Within the European Union, the European
Banking Authority (EBA) has made a number of
recent attempts to promote regulatory trans-
parency, as have other EU financial sector
institutions such as the the European Central Bank
(ECB) and the European Insurance and Occupa-
tional Pensions Authority (EIOPA). We discuss
these initiatives in more detail below, but there is
currently no measure of transparency that is
broadly comparable across countries or that
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captures whether supervisors make public macro-
prudential data. 
In order to address this gap in measuring regula-
tory transparency, we introduce a new interna-
tional financial regulatory data transparency
index. We call it the Financial Regulatory Trans-
parency (FRT) Index. The FRT Index measures
whether countries report core macro-prudential
data about their financial systems to international
financial institutions like the IMF and World Bank.
The Index currently covers 68 high-income and
emerging market economies over 22 years
(1990-2011). The FRT Index is freely available for
download at: https://github.com/FGCH/FRTIndex.
WHY REGULATORY TRANSPARENCY IS IMPORTANT
Regulatory transparency is important in the
context of several ongoing political debates.
Regulatory transparency is connected to greater
liberalisation of financial markets in other parts of
the world, and it can strengthen a capital markets
union by making the financial sector more
efficient. Gelos and Wei (2005) find that interna-
tional investors invest less and capital flight is
greater during crises in opaque countries.
Copelovitch et al (2015) find that countries with
greater regulatory transparency pay lower rates of
interest on their sovereign bonds when debt bur-
dens increase. The logic for this finding is straight-
forward: investors have a better understanding of
what is going on in a country’s banking sector
when regulatory transparency is high, and they
are less nervous about implicit liabilities to the
government accounts from the financial sector,
liabilities which typically go unreported in
government budgets (see Irwin, 2015). 
Despite the significant benefits of regulatory
transparency – including enhancing the
efficiency of financial markets and reducing sov-
ereign borrowing costs – the so-called Five Presi-
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4. See https://www.banking-
supervision.europa.eu/pres
s/speeches/date/2015/htm
l/se150127.en.html;
accessed October 2015.
5. The time inconsistency
problem for monetary
policy assumes the follow-
ing. Labour representatives
will ask for lower wages in
contract negotiations if they
expect that inflation will be
low in the future. A policy-
maker has an incentive to
promise low inflation when
contracts are agreed, but
then to deliver high inflation
in the second period to
stimulate the economy.
Knowing this, labour repre-
sentatives will ask for
higher wages in the first
period. An independent cen-
tral bank, which can commit
credibly to low inflation,
addresses this problem. If
labour representatives do
not know whether inflation
will be low or high in the
next period, they will ask for
higher wages, and this
behaviour then increases
the inflation rate. 
dents’ Report on Completing Europe's Economic
and Monetary Union (Juncker, 2015), in which the
presidents of the EU institutions suggest a way
forward for the euro area, is curiously silent on the
need for transparency in the section ‘Towards a
Financial Union’. Nevertheless, the need for
greater transparency fits the report’s overall
theme of ‘Democratic Accountability, Legitimacy,
and Institutional Strengthening.’ 
One of the best explanations for the need for such
transparency comes from Ignazio Angeloni, an
ECB Supervisory Board Member and Bruegel
fellow-at-large, in a January 2015 speech4. He
describes several parallels between monetary
policy transparency and regulatory transparency.
As with monetary policy, there is a clear rationale
for having a politically-independent bank supervi-
sor5. Angeloni identifies a clear time-inconsis-
tency problem because “supervisory forbearance
may help protect confidence in individual
institutions in the short run, if the supervisor
enjoys a high degree of credibility, but is likely to
be detrimental to such credibility, and to financial
stability, over a longer horizon.” He cautions that
there is a difference between the transparency of
instruments and transparency about supervised
banks, and he argues that proprietary information
for specific banks should be treated confidentially.
However, he also contends that timely reporting
of regulatory information is important for investors
and fosters confidence in the banking sector. The
main message is that the supervisor should be as
transparent as possible, unless transparency
raises concerns about the release of proprietary
information that can damage a specific bank.
As Angeloni (among others) also notes, there is
a general movement towards greater trans-
parency for democratic accountability reasons.
Gandrud and Hallerberg (2015) argue that, in
order for elected officials and citizens to hold
supervisors accountable for acting in the public
interest, they need to be able to observe regula-
tory outputs. Data transparency facilitates this
policy objective. The ability to observe policy out-
puts is especially important in the euro area
because institutional structures make it difficult
for elected European officials to influence super-
visory appointments ex ante. 
EXISTING MEASURES OF REGULATORY
TRANSPARENCY
While one can also consider the transparency of
information from individual banks that financial
supervisors collect (see for example Gandrud and
Hallerberg, 2015), we focus here on the reporting
of macro-prudential data at the level of a country’s
financial sector. Existing assessments of regula-
tory transparency are based on self-reported
surveys of supervisors’ rules and practices.
Financial regulatory transparency indices have
largely been constructed by summing responses
to these survey question. For example, Liedorp et
al (2013) sent a 15 question survey to 42 banking
supervisors, 57 percent of which replied. The
survey had questions on a variety of components
related to multiple aspects of regulatory trans-
parency including what they termed economic,
procedural, political, policy and operational trans-
parency. They then created composite scores by
summing responses to the survey questions for
each of the five areas and by creating a total sum
score. Arnone et al (2007) used a four-point scale
devised from classified IMF staff assessments of
country compliance with IMF codes of good prac-
tice. Masciandaro et al (2008) conducted a survey
of supervisory accountability and included some
items related to transparency. Seelig and Novoa
(2009) also conducted a survey of supervisory
practices, including transparency; however, as
Liedorp et al (2013) note, the questions and coun-
try details are not publicly available. 
Beyond the fact that a number of these trans-
parency indices are not themselves transparent
and do not measure reporting to international
institutions, they have other shortcomings. First,
survey methods are laborious to construct, requir-
ing numerous contacts with supervisors and sec-
ondary verification, largely via institutions’
websites. Second, they rely on temporally
ephemeral information, eg institutional websites
and staff with institutional knowledge. These two
issues are of substantive importance because
they prevent both the easy updating of the indices
at regular intervals and the extension of the
indices back in time. These indices are usually
snapshots that cannot readily be turned into up-
to-date time-series for time-series-cross-sectional
analysis. Third, these surveys – at least those not
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conducted by the IMF – have high non-response
rates. Non-response information is discarded in
the construction of the indices. Fourth, their
construction involves summing responses. This
assumes that each item is equally important for
measuring transparency. However, it is quite likely
that some data items may be ‘easier’ to report
than others because they are, for example, less
politically sensitive. Fifth, the indices do not
include explicit estimates of the degree of uncer-
tainty within which estimates are made.
Finally, these approaches either do not incorpo-
rate prior information into their estimates or do not
do so transparently.
FRT: A NEW MEASURE OF REGULATORY
TRANSPARENCY
To create an index that addresses these issues,
we treat financial regulatory data transparency as
an unobserved latent variable summarising a
country’s likelihood of reporting yearly data on
items included in the World Bank’s Global Finan-
cial Development Database (GFDD). Cihák et al
(2012) created the first version of the database
by collating information that had been tabulated
over many years by a number of international
institutions6. We include countries classified as
high income by the World Bank and countries on
JP Morgan’s Emerging Market Bond Index (EMBI).
We also include China, as it is not in the EMBI.
Using these criteria, the dataset covers 68 coun-
tries, 22 years (1990-2011) and 13 items7, which
are variables for quantities such as bank deposits,
liquid liabilities and non-bank financial institu-
tions’ assets.
6. Access to the most
updated version of the
dataset is available through
http://data.worldbank.org/d
ata-catalog/global-finan-
cial-development;
accessed December 2014.
7. The full list of items
included in the Index is:
private credit by deposit
money banks to GDP (%);
non-bank financial institu-
tions’ assets to GDP (%);
deposit money bank assets
to deposit money bank
assets and central bank
assets (%); central bank
assets to GDP (%); mutual
fund assets to GDP (%);
financial system deposits
to GDP (%); insurance com-
pany assets to GDP (%);
domestic credit to private
sector to GDP (%); bank
lending-deposit spread;
credit to government and
state-owned enterprises to
GDP (%); bank deposits to
GDP (%); liquid liabilities to
GDP (%); bank credit to bank
deposits (%). All of these
variables were originally
gathered in the IMF’s
International Financial
Statistics database, except
for mutual fund assets to
GDP, insurance company
assets to GDP, and bank
lending-deposit spread.
These were available
through the World Bank
In order to calculate the FRT index, we used a tool
called Dynamic Hierarchical Bayesian Item
Response Theory Modelling. Item response theory
(IRT) was initially developed in the field of educa-
tional testing. When testing students, teachers try
to measure students’ underlying, or ‘latent’,
ability in a subject such as maths or biology.
A simple way to do this would be to add up all of
the correct responses to each test question
(item). However, some questions are harder to
answer than others. It may not be possible to
anticipate beforehand how hard students will find
each question to be. IRT models allow us to esti-
mate how difficult questions are and incorporate
this information into our estimation of how able
students’ are in the subject.
We can use this method to measure transparency
as well (see Hollyer et al, 2014). In place of a
dataset of student’s correct/incorrect answers to
test questions, we created a dataset of whether or
not a country reported each of the 13 items in the
GFDD in each year. Rather than measuring a
student’s latent ability in some academic subject,
we used IRT to measure countries’ latent propen-
sity to release data to the GFDD – ie be transparent
– in each year. We measure how ‘difficult’ each
item is to report and we estimate weights of how
much each item contributes to the transparency
index by how often it is reported across all coun-
tries in our sample.
We find that the least-reported items, ie the most
difficult items to report, relate to non-bank insti-
tutions: reporting mutual fund assets, insurance
company assets, and other non-bank financial
institutions – including post-office savings insti-
tutions, building and loan associations, develop-
ment banks and offshore banking institutions.
‘Easy’ items to report tend to involve quantities for
deposit banks such as bank credit to bank
deposits and financial system deposits assets, as
well as central banks such as central bank assets.
Dynamic Hierarchical Bayesian Response Theory
Modelling also enables us to include prior infor-
mation from countries’ reporting in previous years,
thus improving our estimates of how likely each
country was to report in later years. Finally, this
method enables us to estimate our uncertainty
about the transparency scores. This helps us
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Figure 1: Mean FRT Scores (full sample)
Source: Bruegel.
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8. Specifically, it is the
mean of the median coun-
try-year estimates. 
avoid differences between countries being exag-
gerated, a problem that plagues many other
governance indices, especially those that simply
ordinally rank countries.
For full details about our model and its validation
see: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2701852
TRENDS IN REGULATORY TRANSPARENCY, 1990-
2011
Many countries’ FRT scores have changed
dramatically over the past 20 years. Before look-
ing at changes in countries and country groups, it
is useful to consider the overall patterns in the
data. Figure 1 shows the mean FRT score between
1990 and 20118. Most countries have FRT scores
close to zero. This means that they generally report
items that are estimated to be easy to report, but
not the difficult items. A country moves away from
zero either when it reports the more    difficult items
related largely to non-bank financial institution
data (thereby achieving higher   positive scores),
or when they do not report the easy items (thereby
earning negative scores). On average, international
reporting of financial regulatory data increased
from 1990 through about 2005. From 2006, report-
ing declined, with most of the years with the steep-
est declines occurring during the recent financial
crisis. There is another interesting and possibly
related dip in average global transparency: while
average transparency largely increased from 1990
through the mid-2000s, there was a noticeable
stagnation in 1997 and 1998. This was the height
of another multi-country financial crisis and, as we
discuss further below, during the multi-country
restructuring of the French bank Crédit Lyonnais –
the largest bank failure up to that point.
Table 1 shows the countries with the top and
bottom international financial regulatory data
transparency scores in 1990 and 2011. The
countries at the top and bottom of the FRT Index
in 1990 divide roughly into more and less-
developed economies. Interestingly, the 2011
scores seem to have flipped. A number of coun-
tries that were opaque in 1990, such as Russia,
become very transparent in 2011. Likewise, once
highly transparent countries, New Zealand and
Norway, became opaque by 2011, while Canada
moved from most transparent to third least-trans-
parent country.
TRANSPARENCY TRENDS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
This section compares the level of transparency
in the EU with other high-income economies. To
check whether the standards are higher in the
euro area and to be sure that we not picking up
only changes in accession countries in the mid-
2000s, we focus on members of the euro area,
and the pre-2004 member states (the EU15).
Figure 2 compares the mean FRT Scores of euro-
area and EU15 countries to those of other high-
income countries in the sample. It illustrates that
EU member states are less transparent in
reporting national aggregate data to the IMF and
World Bank compared to other high-income coun-
tries. In Figure 3, which shows FRT scores for the
euro-area countries in the sample, we can see that
almost all have scores close to zero for much of
the sample period. Through the mid-2000s, non-
EU high-income countries offered on average
more international regulatory data transparency
than either euro-area or EU15 members. The
reason for the discrepancy is that few European
countries report non-bank financial institution
Table 1: Most and least-transparent countries (based on median estimated FRT), ranked by FRT
Index scores
1990 2011
Most transparent
Canada Brazil
Japan Colombia
United States Russian Federation
Netherlands Peru
Philippines South Africa
Least transparent
Ukraine San Marino
Croatia Barbados
Czech Republic Canada
Russian Federation New Zealand
Brunei Darussalam Norway
Source: Bruegel.
9.  The only EU member
states to report this item in
the sample period are:
Cyprus (2004-07), Ireland
(1990-98), Netherlands
(1990-98) and Sweden
(1995-99).
10. The Netherlands had a
score of 1.06 in 1991.
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INCREASINGLY TRANSPARENT COUNTRIES
The patterns of change in the overall dataset are
instructive for understanding the position most
European countries face. Moving beyond the EU
countries, we see that a number of countries made
significant improvements in reporting during the
1990s and 2000s. Figure 4 shows the trans-
parency scores for the fifteen countries that made
the largest cumulative improvements to their
median FRT scores from 1990 through 2011.
These countries tended to be upper middle-
income countries such as Argentina, Brazil, the
Czech Republic, Croatia, Russia, and South Africa,
which went through considerable processes of
opening up to international capital markets during
the sample period (Ahmed and Zlate 2014).
Reporting more financial system data to interna-
tional financial institutions may have been part of
this process, since making such data available to
foreign investors via the IMF and World Bank could
have given investors more information on which
to make judgments about financial system risks.
These significant increases in transparency might
also have contributed to these countries’ ability to
attract foreign investment over the last two
decades.
Germany, as a high-income, industrialised coun-
try, is seemingly a notable outlier in this subsam-
ple. However, the general process behind
Germany’s increasing transparency may be simi-
data – eg data on assets from insurance compa-
nies, state-owned non-bank institutions, postal
savings banks, investment banks, and offshore
financial institutions9 – over the entire sample
period. Since about 2004, many euro-area coun-
tries have stopped reporting a basic quantity: the
bank lending to deposit spread (see Figure 7).
Only during the height of the financial crisis did
reporting in other high-income OECD countries
decline towards the low average level of EU
member states. The US is notable for both its rela-
tively high transparency level and its consistency
in reporting data, even during the financial crisis.
No EU country has ever achieved a median trans-
parency score at or above the US’s 1.1 level10. 
While these are findings on macro-prudential data,
we note that there is already interesting work on
regulatory transparency in the EU at the micro
level. Gandrud and Hallerberg (2015) examined
whether or not EU member-state regulators
regularly release regulatory data about individual
banks. They found that overall member states
were markedly opaque, especially when com-
pared to US regulators. The FRT considers the
transparency of the overall financial sector, not
just the banking sector, and the dataset consists
of country aggregates, rather than individual bank
information. But the evidence suggests a similar
trend to that found with the micro data--when com-
pared to other countries at a similar income level,
transparency in the EU is lower.
0.0
0.4
0.8
1.2
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
M
ea
n 
 FR
T  
sc
or
e
Euro area
0.0
0.4
0.8
1.2
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
EU−15
US
Other high income, 
OECD not EU
EU
Figure 2: Mean FRT scores for euro-area members and the EU15 vs. all other high-income countries
Source: Bruegel.
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Figure 3: FRT scores for each country in the euro area by 2015 included in the FRT sample
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Figure 4: FRT transparency scores for the 15 countries with the largest cumulative reporting
improvement (ordered by improvement rank)
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INCREASINGLY OPAQUE COUNTRIES
Figure 6 shows the 15 countries that had the
greatest cumulative decline in their financial reg-
ulatory data reporting between 1990 and 2011.
One particularly interesting case is Hungary. In
1990 Hungary had a median FRT score above 0.
This score changes over time, with a clear shift to
low transparency in 2009. The 2009 figures would
have been reported to international institutions in
2010, the year that Viktor Orbán’s Christian Dem-
ocratic People’s Party entered government. This
government introduced a number of major eco-
nomic and financial policy changes that
sometimes directly contradicted Hungary’s inter-
national economic commitments, including reduc-
ing the independence of the central bank. The
same political process might have caused Hun-
gary to dramatically reduce its reporting of finan-
cial regulatory data to international institutions.
Such a shift towards opacity is not only confined
to countries that so openly rejected international
standards. There is a large group of established
lar to that of the emerging market economies. Ger-
many’s traditionally parochial capital markets
went through a process of financial market liber-
alisation and internationalisation during this
period (Jacob, 2015).  
A group of small Persian Gulf states became
noticeably more transparent recently. Though
they are still fairly opaque (see Figure 5), they
improved during the mid to late-2000s. This was
a period where Qatar, Dubai and Abu Dhabi were
attempting to transform themselves into interna-
tional financial centres. This finding is informative
given the efforts to complete a capital markets
union in the European Union, because it suggests
that jurisdictions that want to pursue deeper finan-
cial market integration become more transparent. 
The finding from the countries that increased reg-
ulatory transparency is the same – increases in
transparency are accompanied by the opening up
and deepening of financial markets overall. This
point is relevant for efforts to develop a capital
markets union in the EU.
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Source: Bruegel. 
Figure 5: FRT transparency scores for three Gulf States
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democracies with surprising declines in financial
regulatory data reporting over the sample period,
including Denmark, New Zealand, Japan, Israel,
Norway and Canada. Canada is a particularly
extreme example: from the beginning of the
sample (1990) through 2006, Canada reported all
of the items in the Index, thereby earning the high-
est FRT score, by far, over this period. However,
reporting declined from 2006, to the point that,
from 2009-11, Canada only reported about 20 per-
cent of the component variables in the FRT Index. 
It is not yet clear why the reporting of financial reg-
ulatory data in these countries has declined so
dramatically since the mid-2000s. This has not
been the general trend in established democra-
cies. For example, why did Norway virtually stop
reporting, while Sweden changed very little over
the entire period? Why did reporting in Canada
decline so dramatically, while reporting in the US
has held constant at a relatively high level? More
work is needed to understand why some countries
that otherwise closely adhere to international
reporting standards virtually stopped reporting
data on their financial systems to the World Bank
and IMF starting in the mid-2000s.
FINANCIAL TRANSPARENCY DURING EPISODES OF
FINANCIAL STRESS
Episodes of financial stress are sometimes asso-
ciated with declines in financial data reporting.
Reporting declined noticeably during the recent
global financial crisis. Figure 7 shows the propor-
tion of countries reporting each of the 13 items in
the years 2000, 2005, 2008 and 2011. Reporting
of many items related to bank deposits, private
credit and insurance institution assets declined
notably from 2008, although for some variables
and countries (such as bank lending-deposit
spreads in the EU countries), reporting had been
declining for a number of years prior to the onset
of the global crisis.
Another striking example of the decline in trans-
parency during episodes of financial stress is the
simultaneous drop in reporting by France, the
Benelux countries and Austria in the mid- to late
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Figure 6: FRT transparency scores for the 15 countries with the largest cumulative reporting
declines (ordered by decline rank)
10
BRUEGEL
POLICY
CONTRIBUTION FINANCIAL REGULATORY TRANSPARENCY: NEW DATA AND IMPLICATIONS FOR EU POLICY
1990s (see Figure 8). This decline immediately
followed the collapse and controversial bailout of
France’s largest bank, Crédit Lyonnais, as a con-
sequence of its gross mismanagement. At the
time, according to Caprio and Klingebiel (1996),
Crédit Lyonnais’ collapse was the largest bank fail-
ure globally. In the wake of the Crédit Lyonnais col-
lapse, France, the Netherlands, Belgium and
Austria simultaneously stopped reporting seven
of the 13 items – most referring to credit provision
by banks11 – in the FRT Index in 1998; Luxem-
bourg largely followed suit in 1999. This dramatic
reporting decline coincides with a specific phase
of the Crédit Lyonnais restructuring process: the
11. Specifically: private
credit by deposit money
banks to GDP (%); deposit
money bank assets to
deposit money bank assets
and central bank assets (%);
financial system deposits to
GDP (%); insurance company
assets to GDP (%); financial
system deposits to GDP (%);
domestic credit to private
sector (% of GDP); credit to
government and state
owned enterprises to GDP
(%); bank credit to bank
deposits (%).
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Figure 7: Proportion of countries reporting each item in the FRT (grouped by sector type)
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Figure 8: FRT transparency scores for France, the Benelux countries and Austria
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sale of the core French institution and its non-
French subsidiaries. Specifically, Crédit Lyonnais’
subsidiaries in Belgium, the Netherlands and Aus-
tria were sold off. Crédit Lyonnais (Belgium) was
sold to Deutsche Bank and Crédit Lyonnais
(Austria) was sold to Anglo Irish Bank in 1998.
Crédit Lyonnais Bank Nederland was sold to the
Belgian Generale Bank in 1995 and subsequently
became Generale Bank Nederland. At this point, it
is not clear exactly why reporting decreased so
markedly during this period. However, this episode
does demonstrate that transparency practices
might be ignored during times of severe financial
crisis or stress, especially if reporting practices
are not fully institutionalised. 
CONCLUSION: POLICY PROPOSALS FOR A MORE
TRANSPARENT UNION
Our findings using the FRT Index demonstrate that
the availability of financial regulatory data trans-
parency varies considerably in different countries
and over time, both within and beyond the EU.
European countries provide a relatively low level
of transparency compared to other high-income
OECD countries. This is especially true when we
compare EU members to another large banking
union: the United States. In order to improve the
efficiency and democratic accountability of the
European banking and capital markets unions, it
would be useful to institutionalise the reporting of
financial system data to international institutions
such as the IMF and World Bank.
We propose that the European Central Bank, Euro-
pean Banking Authority, the European Insurance
and Occupational Pensions Authority and the
European Securities and Markets Authority –
which together have supervisory powers and
access to the relevant data on currently under-
reported quantities – take a greater and more
active role in coordinating the reporting of regula-
tory data to the IMF and World Bank. Especially
within the euro area, this would have the benefit
of improving the euro area’s relationship and rep-
resentation with the IMF. While these are Euro-
pean-level institutions, they should report the
national-level data in order to ensure greater
regulatory transparency for the euro area as a
whole and for its member states. Even though this
type of data is not directly within the scope of the
capital markets union, such reporting is certainly
in the spirit of creating a more efficient financial
sector.
This increased transparency is extremely impor-
tant. It provides markets and voters with more
information about the relative health of a country’s
financial sector. Past empirical work shows that
markets are more nervous about countries that
have less regulatory transparency when their debt
burdens increase. The reason is that markets do
not know what other liabilities the government
might face, and they punish the less-transparent
countries with higher interest rates. This trans-
parency is also relevant for increasing the ability
of voters to hold their institutions accountable.
Finally, and relatedly, one might ask if the prob-
lem is not with the supervisor releasing the data
but with the relevant institutions that are not
reporting it. That is, a supervisor cannot report
data it does not have. As we discussed in past
work (Gandrud and Hallerberg 2015), there is also
an issue of regulatory transparency for individual
banks. In the United States, where this type of
transparency is high, banks fall under the US
common deposit insurance scheme only if they
report reliable data that the supervisor then
makes public. Given the initial moves towards a
common deposit insurance scheme in the Euro-
pean banking union, a similar requirement should
be part of any extension of deposit insurance
across borders, be it as a common pool or as
linked pools of different national programmes.
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